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Adviser:  Rodrigo Cantarero 
Small businesses are considered important engines for job growth and economic 
development by policy makers worldwide.  One of the most commonly cited constraints 
of small businesses is a lack of access to capital.  To address this constraint, small 
business loan guarantee programs have been established in over 100 countries.  There are 
a variety of types of guarantee funds, with the most significant differences being which 
borrowers are eligible for guarantees, and how borrowers are approved for guarantees.  
There is currently no clear delineation between types of programs and the economic 
conditions they operate in, though some trends are becoming apparent.  However, these 
trends may not be leading to the best economic outcomes possible.  By better matching 
the structure of the guarantee fund to the economic conditions it operates in, the 
program‘s success in meeting economic development goals may be greatly improved.  
Many programs in developing countries may not be taking advantage of bank expertise 
and may be limiting the scope of their effectiveness. At the same time, programs in 
developed countries may be wasting resources by scattering their efforts too thinly and 
subsidizing less competitive firms to the detriment of local economic development.   
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Chapter 1   
Introduction 
Economic development efforts come in many forms, but almost all such programs share 
the common goals of increasing economic activity and promoting employment growth.  
Economic development programs that target small businesses and entrepreneurs are 
extremely common in both the United States and internationally.  While the number of 
small businesses worldwide is enormous, their fragmentation and small individual sizes 
leaves each very vulnerable to market forces beyond their control.  However, because 
small businesses, as a group, are recognized by governments worldwide as powerful 
economic forces and major engines of job creation, these governments seek to address 
constraints that small businesses face.  Loan guarantee funds targeted at small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) is one such program, and is meant to address SME‘s 
difficulties in obtaining bank loans.  The definition of an SME varies by country, with 
some basing status on solely on the number of employees or total revenue, while others 
have different thresholds for employment or revenue depending on the industry.  
Therefore the statistics and research regarding SME‘s may not be consistent.  However, 
the most common trait for inclusion in this group is having fewer than 500 employees, 
and, unless otherwise noted, that will be considered the standard for this paper.   
While loan guarantee funds are common worldwide, they vary greatly in their structure 
and operation.  Furthermore, efforts to accurately measure their impact, and thus better 
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implement the most effective forms, have been sparse.  The purpose of this research is to 
better understand guarantee funds, as well as to try to identify which approaches or 
program structures may be best suited for countries at different levels of economic 
development.  This will be accomplished by exploring the nature of the banking industry 
in relation to small businesses, the international experience in guarantee fund programs, 
and examining why there exists a need for such programs amongst small businesses. 
Research Questions 
The purpose of this research is to develop an understanding of small business loan 
guarantee funds, as well as their role in economic development, particularly in less 
developed countries.  To this end, the various operating structures that exist 
internationally will be explored, with particular emphasis on differences in structure 
between developed countries and less developed countries.  The role of banking in small 
business development will also be explored in order to understand the allocation of credit 
by banks. 
The overarching research question is whether certain guarantee fund structures are better 
suited for different levels of economic development, or for meeting different types of 
economic development goals.  Furthermore, if the structure does matter, can a system be 
developed to help policy makers choose the structure that best fits their unique 
circumstances and economic development goals?   
A variety of topics will be explored in order to answer these questions.  These include 
describing the general nature of guarantee funds, how they operate, their intended impact, 
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and the theoretical support basis for why they are needed.  Furthermore, the variety of 
different structures will be examined, including their strengths and weaknesses, in order 
to better understand which structure best fits particular situations. 
 
Methodology 
As there are great difficulties quantifying and measuring the impact of an economic 
development program, such as a loan guarantee fund, a qualitative approach that first 
pursues an understanding of loan guarantee programs and then arrives at some 
conclusions as to their effectiveness based on perceived performance is followed.  Based 
on these observations, it finalizes with recommendations.   The literature on the topic, 
including empirical research, statistics, program materials, and other writings on the 
subject, will be studied in order to develop an understanding of the different types of 
guarantee funds, as well as the nature of the operations and desired outcomes.   With the 
major types of guarantee fund programs identified, a review of each type will be 
undertaken to better understand their strengths and weaknesses, specific requirements and 
the situations in which they appear to be most effective.   
To place all of this information into context, the role of credit and banking in small 
business development will also be examined.  The literature on this subject is more 
widespread and more quantitative.  This should lend itself to creating a more objective 
determination of what is needed, in terms of credit assistance, for small business 
development in various situations.  
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Literature Review—A Brief Overview 
The following section is a brief overview of the literature and research on small business 
loan guarantee funds used to create this paper.  A more detailed discussion of the various 
topics and outcomes of the research will follow in later sections. 
While the research on loan guarantee based mechanisms for small business development 
is not extensive, it does provide a useful base of literature to draw from.  However, a 
recurring theme throughout the literature is the need for more research to provide better 
direction for practitioners.  Due to the relatively small size of most of these programs 
relative to their national economy, accurately measuring their outcomes is a continuing 
difficulty.  Much of the literature has been centered on the theoretical workings of these 
programs, or on studying the structure and general metrics of existing funds.  While this 
research has helped to develop a body of literature, a fair amount has been contradictory, 
and very little consensus exists as to what funds are genuinely successful, or if guarantee 
funds are even an effective development tool at all.  Furthermore, the way in which funds 
are typically categorized in the literature is very broad and does not adequately address 
the differences between fund types within a category.  This leaves practitioners in an 
extremely difficult position, as they often have incomplete information, as well as little 
concrete evidence, to draw from when structuring a guarantee fund. 
Several large international organizations have published reports regarding Guarantee 
Funds.  One of the most thorough was published by the International Labor Organization 
(a specialized agency of the United Nations) entitled ―Guarantee Funds for Small 
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Enterprises:  A manual for guarantee fund managers‖ (Molenaar and Deelen 2004).  This 
manual provides a comprehensive overview of the operations, processes and procedures 
of a Guarantee Fund.  However, it only offers a very brief and generalized summary of 
the different models in use and does not go into sufficient detail regarding their strengths 
and weaknesses.  While it does cover the operations of two different categories of funds, 
it does so in an extremely generalized way, giving no guidance to the practitioner on 
other options available, or how to adapt the program to their specific situation.  The 
World Bank published a large report entitled ―Finance for All:  Policies and Pitfalls in 
Expanding Access‖ that includes a section on Guarantee Funds (World Bank 2008).  
While this report presents many of the positives and negatives of Guarantee Funds in 
general, particularly as they relate to developing countries, it does not go into detail about 
the various forms of Guarantee Funds or any significant details about their operations.  A 
report created by USAID entitled ―Designing Loan Guarantees to Spur Growth in 
Developing Countries‖ also offers an overview of guarantee funds in less developed 
countries (Freedman 2004).  While this report does have a section regarding loan 
guarantees to SME‘s, the majority of the report is focused on larger guarantees, such as 
for infrastructure projects.  However, the report does offer a very thorough analysis of the 
poor state of credit availability in less developed countries, why this inhibits their growth, 
and how guarantee funds of any type can address this issue.   
Unfortunately, much of the work regarding measurements of the economic impact of loan 
guarantees has been conducted by a small body of authors and is relatively limited.  The 
most relevant of this research is a recent study of the Small Business Administration‘s 
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loan guarantee programs by the United States Federal Reserve.  This study examined 
extremely detailed data within areas of cities and found a correlation between the 
presence of SBA loans and higher employment levels, particularly in low income areas 
(Craig, Jackson and Thomson 2008).  Other studies by the same authors though found 
weaker correlations between SBA loans and other indicators, such as per capita income, 
and the authors pointed out that their results were not conclusive.  To date, this is the only 
research I have found that has empirically measured the economic impact of a guarantee 
fund.   
Several research articles exist seeking to compare Guarantee Funds across various 
countries and to compare their results empirically.  The most thorough of these is a World 
Bank working paper entitled ―The Typology of Partial Credit Guarantee Funds Around 
the World‖ (Beck, Klapper and Mendoza 2008).  This paper includes the results of a 
survey of 76 guarantee funds around the world regarding a large variety of characteristics 
(though the survey data was refined to 46 useable samples).  The research showed the 
level of government involvement in programs, the level of pricing, which borrowers were 
eligible, the processes used by the fund, and the use of risk management techniques 
among many other elements.  A correlation analysis was also performed using the survey 
data alongside GDP data for each respective country.  While the data is exhaustive, and a 
broad picture of guarantee funds around the world can be formed, the author‘s are unable 
to draw many conclusions aside from the prevalence of government support and the lack 
of risk management techniques.  They state the primary reason for this is the difficulty in 
comparing programs across diverse economies without time series or loan level data.  
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Furthermore, while the authors attempted to categorize funds by a variety of factors, there 
were still gaps in this data, including eight funds claiming not to fit in any category, and 
two funds claiming to fit into all categories.  A similar, but more geographically focused 
report was prepared by the Go Network (a European Union funded project) entitled 
―Benchmark Analysis of the Credit Guarantee Organizations in the Central, Adriatic, 
Danubian and South-Eastern European Space (CADSES)‖ (Go Network 2006).  This 
report attempts to establish benchmarks for the roles of Guarantee Funds throughout 18 
countries in Europe.  The countries are grouped into peer groups based on GDP level and 
comparisons are conducted utilizing a range of statistics, such as number of guarantee 
fund organizations, number of small businesses, and amount of loans guaranteed, among 
others.  The report also offers individual country analysis.  While there is some 
discussion of different types of guarantee funds, this is mostly limited to contrasting 
programs with public support versus those primarily supported privately.  Another 
comparison report was created by the Asian Development Bank entitled ―People‘s 
Republic of China: Development of Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Credit 
Guarantee Companies‖ (Davies 2007).  In creating the report, the author studied the 25 
largest SME guarantee funds worldwide and compared them on a variety of factors.  This 
report reiterated many of the common findings of the other studies, which are that 
governments are heavily involved and risk mechanisms are rare.  While the report is 
valuable in comparing large programs in developed countries, it does not explore 
programs in developing countries. 
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Other research on guarantee programs has typically involved either a case study or 
empirical research on a single guarantee program or a small cohort of programs.  The 
most common areas of empirical research involve trying to determine whether the loans 
are actually additional, that is they would not have been made without the guarantee 
(Cowan, Drexler and Yanez 2008; Cukauskiene 2006; Riding, Madill and Haines 2007; 
Zecchini and Ventura 2009), and the economic impact of guarantee funds 
(Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 2006; Benavente, Galetovic and 
Sanhueza; Bradshaw 2002; Park 1995; Oh et al. 2009) or both of these factors (Boocock 
and Shariff 2005).  These papers come to widely differing conclusions regarding the 
outcomes of guarantee funds..  For example, Riding, et al, estimates that in a Canadian 
fund almost 75% of loans would not have been made at the same terms without the 
guarantee, while Zecchini, et al. find that only 12% of the total loan amounts in an Italian 
fund were actually additional.  Regarding the economic impact of guarantee funds, for 
example, Bradshaw finds that a California fund helped recipients avoid cutting 14% of 
their workforce, while Oh, et al, call into question the long term economic impact of a 
South Korean fund, since guarantees seemed to be aimed at helping less productive firms 
survive rather than helping firms grow or innovate.  These differences can likely be 
contributed to differences in the structure of the guarantee fund, differences in the 
economy they operate in, and differences in research methodology between the studies.  
Capital access programs (CAP‘s) are a type of guarantee based mechanism to support 
SME lending, but differ from traditional guarantee funds in how their funds are handled.  
They are most prevalent in the United States, with the first program being created in 
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Michigan in 1986.  Though more than 20 states and several municipalities operate 
CAP‘s, there is a dearth of literature on the subject, particularly recent research.  These 
types of programs, though directed at the same problem and utilizing essentially the same 
mechanism, are also almost never mentioned in the general guarantee fund literature. The 
United States Treasury published several comprehensive reviews between 1998 and 
2001of CAP‘s operating in the United States (United States Treasury 2001), however no 
reviews or further research has been completed since then.  The Treasury report 
concluded that CAP‘s were able to reach borrowers that are otherwise poorly served by 
other lending programs, and that CAP‘s were responsible for some level of job retention 
and creation.  The Michigan Strategic Fund and the Michigan Jobs Commission funded a 
report on the Michigan Capital Access Program in 1998 (Hamlin 1998).   This report 
found that 88% of recipients of CAP loans met the criteria of being ―almost bankable‖ 
and likely would not have received the loan otherwise.  Furthermore, the research found 
that the program did promote job growth and economic development in excess of its 
costs.  
While the literature does not provide a consensus as to the effectiveness of guarantee 
funds, it does provide extensive research material and can be greatly utilized in detailing 
how funds operate, as well as in differentiating between types of funds.  Though there are 
various attempts to categorize guarantee programs by broad criteria, there is very little to 
describe the differences within these categories.  More importantly, there is little 
guidance involving what characteristics of a fund may make it suitable for a particular 
situation or level of local economic development. Furthermore, a significant gap in the 
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literature exists in relation to Capital Access Programs.  The following research seeks to 
fill these gaps by more thoroughly examining the variety of guarantee fund mechanisms, 
and by including capital access programs in the comparison 
I will now detail what a guarantee fund is, how it works, why it is used, and the most 
common types.  Furthermore, the strengths and weaknesses of the different types of 
funds, as well their outcomes will be explored to identify what can be learned from these 
experiences, particularly for countries at different levels of economic development.  
Finally, the nature of small business in an economy, as well as the role of banking in 
small business development will be explored to provide important background for better 
understanding the role of guarantee funds. 
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Chapter 2   
Guarantee Fund Basics 
A guarantee fund, in its most common form, is an independent entity that acts as a third 
party between a lending bank and a borrower who does not meet all of the bank‘s 
qualifications, but are otherwise considered a good credit risk.  The guarantee fund 
provides the bank security, in the form of a guarantee for a portion of the loan, in order to 
enable the borrower to obtain a loan.  In an international survey, guarantee programs in 
both developed and developing countries were rated as the government program that 
most influenced the bank‘s involvement with SME‘s (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008) 
Guarantee Funds (GF) are typically targeted toward a specific group of potential 
borrowers that are seen as being underserved by the formal credit markets, but whose 
success is deemed to be important to the development of a group of people, an industry or 
a region (Honohan 2008).  Although guarantee funds exist to cover many different kinds 
of borrowers, including large corporations, and even governments, the focus of this 
research is on those targeted at small and medium sized businesses.  However, though 
they can also be targeted toward more specific SME borrowers, such as borrowers in 
inner cities or rural areas, borrowers in certain industries such as agriculture or 
technology, or toward borrowers in certain demographics, such as women or ethnic 
minorities.  In any of these instances, there will often be potential borrowers who have 
strong business plans and are otherwise good credit risks, but do not quite meet all of a 
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bank‘s requirements to obtain credit, most typically regarding collateral.  This is 
particularly true of smaller borrowers.  A review of over 50,000 Italian loans found that 
smaller firms are typically required to post more collateral than larger firms (Pozzolo 
2004).   Unless they can overcome the missing requirements, the borrower must find 
financing elsewhere, often at a drastically higher cost, if it is available at all.   
A guarantee fund helps borrowers to overcome this credit gap by providing the bank a 
loan guarantee as a substitute, or in some cases, in addition to, any collateral required by 
the bank.  This mechanism allows borrowers to utilize the formal banking sector, which 
not only lowers their costs, but as the bank and GF will require more extensive reporting, 
it typically helps move the company toward more professional practices.  Furthermore, 
the borrower will begin building a formal credit history which will make gaining future 
loans more likely. From the banks side, they gain new customers, as well as experience in 
lending to new sectors (Honohan 2008). 
How does a Guarantee Fund Operate? 
The creation of a guarantee fund begins with an initial investment of capital.  This capital 
is often provided by a government (from the city level to the national level), or by a non-
governmental organization or donor with an interest in promoting development in a 
specific sector or region.   
The Guarantee Fund then creates partnership agreements with banks that lay out specific 
operating arrangements.  These agreements may vary amongst partner banks, but will 
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typically include items such as the types of borrowers eligible for guarantees, the size, 
duration and purpose of loans, and the mechanism for paying the guarantees in the event 
of a default. 
There are a variety of guarantee fund structures, but a typical series of steps a borrower 
will take are as follows: 
 A borrower first applies directly to a bank for a loan 
 The bank will review the application and recommend approval or denial 
 If the application is approved as is, the loan will be granted and the GF will not be 
involved 
 If the loan is not approved because the borrower‘s application is inadequate in 
some way, such as lacking a required level of collateral, and they meet the criteria 
for borrowers laid out in the agreement between the bank and the Guarantee Fund, 
they will be referred to the Guarantee Fund 
 The application will be forwarded to the guarantee fund (by the bank or by the 
borrower), for their review 
 The GF will independently review the loan application for approval or denial.  
The level of investigation will vary with the type of program. 
 If the loan application is approved, the GF provides the bank a guarantee for the 
required amount of collateral, and the loan is issued 
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 The borrower will repay the bank, and will also pay the guarantee fund an annual 
fee (typically between 2-5% of the loan value which can be included in the loan 
payments) 
 If the borrower repays the loan, the GF is released from its guarantee 
 If the borrower defaults on the loan, and the bank meets all of its obligations in 
attempting to collect on the debt, the GF will reimburse the bank for the agreed 
amount.  
Advantages of a Guarantee Fund 
There are several advantages, in terms of economic development, to employing capital in 
a guarantee fund rather than in typical lending entities (even those providing very low 
interest loans).  The biggest advantage is that a GF is able to highly leverage its capital, 
allowing much greater impact from the investment.  Because a GF doesn‘t actually make 
loans, but instead issues guarantees against its capital, as long as partner banks agree, the 
GF can issue far more in guarantees than it actually holds in capital, typically from 5 to 
10 times the amount of capital.  For example, the Thailand Guarantee Fund operates at a 
multiple of 7 (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 2006).  However, in some 
industrialized countries, leverage can reach 20-25 times (Davies 2007; Levitsky 1997)   
A well operated fund operating for 5 years should reasonably expect to have a multiple of 
5, meaning $1 million in capital can realistically translate into $5 million in guarantees to 
banks.  Depending on the operation of the fund, the guarantee will typically be for 
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between 50-80% of the loan amount.  This means that the actual amount loaned to 
SME‘s, based on $1 million in guarantee capital may be between $6.25 million and $10 
million. Many well established guarantee funds can reach a multiple of 10 after 7-10 
years of operation, and adding a re-guarantee program, as exists in Japan and Germany 
can increase the multiple to 20 or more (Davies 2007).   As the loans are repaid, the fees 
earned will increase the amount of capital available, further increasing the amount of 
loans made available. 
This powerful multiplier is just one of the advantages of guarantee funds though.  
Another advantage is access to the formal credit markets for underserved groups.  For 
example, when many small businesses need credit, their only option is the informal, or 
grey, market, which may range from family and friends, to less than scrupulous money 
lenders.  While borrowing from family and friends may have a low monetary cost, it 
comes with other costs, such as emotional stress, as well as putting a heavy strain on a 
family‘s financial security.  Borrowing from a grey market money lender is also 
problematic because it will often come at prices 2 – 5 times higher than banks 
(Wattanapruttipaisan 2003; Colwell 2008).  By accessing the formal credit market 
through the use of guarantees, borrowers can lower their costs of capital and their risks 
significantly (Arping, Lуrбnth and Morrison 2008).  Furthermore, the business practices 
of both borrowers and existing financial institutions are improved.  The higher degree of 
reporting that a bank may require can help push the business to more professional 
practices, while the bank will gain experience working with a new type of borrower that 
they otherwise would not have engaged.  Finally, creating a relationships with a bank will 
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not only improve the borrowers chances of getting future loans with less security, but will 
also create a credit history for them to present to other lenders. 
Another advantage of guarantee funds is that they provide a business solution to a social 
problem, rather than simply a charitable solution.  Because it is not a low interest loan, 
there is a better chance that businesses with an actual need to access credit will receive 
the assistance.  The reason for this is that low interest loans have significant competition 
for limited funds, some of which will inevitably go to people who don‘t need cheap 
money (whether through fraud, insufficient credit appraisals, or personal connections 
with the lender).  While low interest loans certainly have their place, and are an 
extremely valuable development tool, a guarantee fund provides an option for borrowers 
that can borrow at market prices, thus freeing up more low interest loans for those that 
they are truly targeted toward. 
What type of credit is guaranteed 
Guarantees are used to facilitate access to a variety of different kinds of credit, including 
for starting a new business from scratch, expanding or purchasing new equipment for an 
existing business, and providing working capital to finance the day to day operations of a 
business.  While this is a little explored area of guarantee fund operations, but it may be 
instructive to examine the issue. 
The majority of guarantee funds do not place a great deal of restrictions on the use of the 
loan (with the exception of common disclaimers barring their use for such things as 
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illegal activities or stock speculation).  However, there is one notable exception.  The 
largest Canadian guarantee fund, the Canadian Small Business Financing Program 
(known as the CSBF), for example, does not allow guarantees for working capital 
(Riding, Madill and Haines 2007; Heron & Company 2007).  This is in sharp contrast to 
Japanese guarantee funds that have the vast majority of their guarantees (85%) covering 
working capital (Levitsky, Prasad and Ranga N. 1995).   The CSBF chose to restrict 
working capital loans from the program because of the fear that they would have higher 
default rates than asset backed loans, though they have continued to explore the subject 
since at least 1998.   
The CSBF commissioned a report specifically regarding working capital in 2006.  The 
report found that SME borrowers seeking working capital loans were not likely to be 
turned down at a higher rate by banks, and that banks did not take the type of loan 
(investment or working capital) into consideration when making the appraisal, leaving the 
author to conclude that there was no clear funding gap for SME‘s needing working 
capital (Riding 2006).  The report did conclude that it was likely that a certain class of 
relatively risky firms, such as startups and young firms with little collateral, do have 
difficulties in receiving working capital loans, and these would be the most likely 
recipients of guarantees.  The report generally had an unfavorable view of expanding the 
program to include working capital loans, based primarily on the lack of a demonstrated 
funding gap, as well as the increased riskiness of the borrowers likely to receive the 
guarantee.  The report relied heavily on interviews with bankers, and statistics regarding 
rejected applications.  This seems to give a very narrow view of the issue.  An analysis of 
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default rates on the different types of loans or by different types of borrowers would have 
seemed beneficial, as well as a discussion on the role of working capital versus 
investment loans for economic development. 
There was an interesting contradiction in the report however, regarding how banks regard 
working capital loans.  The author finds that banks do not judge loans based on their 
purpose (working capital or investment), stating in the report‘s conclusion: 
Both qualitative and quantitative data reflect that the use of the proceeds 
of loans do not figure into commercial lenders‘ decisions on loan 
applications. (Riding 2006, pg. 22) 
However, in an earlier section describing interviews with bankers, there are several 
quotes from different bankers that point out the riskiness of working capital loans. For 
example: ―working capital loans are much riskier‖ and ―working capital is the most risky 
loan you can do.‖ (Riding 2006) 
 It would have seemed prudent to explore this contradiction further, since it would seem 
obvious that if bankers consider them more risky, they would certainly take that into 
account in their approval decisions.     
A later report conducted for the CSBF regarding administrative functions pointed out that 
there did not seem to be a reason for the differentiation in loan types by the guarantee 
fund, and recommended that the CSBF change its rules to allow working capital loans 
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(Heron & Company 2007).  As of March 2010, the CSFB does not allow loans for 
working capital (Canada Small Business Finance Programkotec 2010). 
As most funds have little restrictions on the type of credit they will guarantee, there are 
few other mentions in the literature on the distinction between types of credit.  An 
exception is research on the UK Small Firms Loan Guarantee program that found 
guaranteed loans for working capital defaulted at a higher rate than loans made for 
investments (though no distinction was made for startups versus existing businesses; 
Cowling and Mitchell 2003).   
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Chapter 3   
Types of Guarantee Funds 
There are currently a wide variety of guarantee funds operating all over the world.  In 
their earlier forms, most programs followed one of a few common models, typically retail 
or portfolio; however, as the programs have evolved, many have developed unique traits 
to suit their specific needs, and several hybrid models have been introduced as well. 
Therefore categorizing guarantee funds has become something of a challenge.  While 
there are still several broad categories of operations, many other factors play a prominent 
role in the structure of a guarantee fund as well, making it important to not become too 
encumbered by old labels.   
All of the guarantee programs described here have the same basic objective, to allow a 
creditworthy SME or entrepreneur, who does not quite meet a bank‘s lending 
requirements, to be able to receive a loan.  This is accomplished by a third party, the GF, 
offering to guarantee a significant portion of the loan in the event of a default.  Typically, 
no collateral is actually issued by the guarantee fund to the bank; instead the bank accepts 
a claim on the guarantee fund‘s capital or the full faith and credit of the government 
supporting the fund.  In the event of a default, a contract between the bank and the GF 
will spell out the steps a bank must take to receive payment, including what steps the 
bank must have taken to collect on the loan.  After payment is made to the bank, the GF 
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may continue to seek to collect from the borrower.  Many parts of this process are 
virtually identical, regardless of the structural differences of the funds.   
Traditionally, the major difference in GF‘s was in their interactions with banks and with 
borrowers.  A retail guarantee fund will typically have some form of public presence and 
will often have significant interaction with the borrower.  Borrowers are typically 
referred to the GF by a bank in the event their loan application does not meet 
requirements; though in some cases a borrower may apply to the GF first.  Independent 
loan appraisals are a key trait of retail GF‘s and are conducted before the guarantee is 
approved.  The time necessary for the loan appraisal varies depending on the program, as 
well as the complexity of the loan.  As an example of the time necessary, Kafalat, the 
Lebanese SME guarantee program, states that a decision will be made in a maximum of 3 
weeks, though smaller loans tend to receive decisions quicker, usually in 7 days (Kafalat 
S.A.L. 2010).   This time frame seems relatively standard for most retail GF‘s.  
Interaction during repayment can also vary greatly among retail GF models, but often 
there is at least some extra degree of monitoring. 
Due to the duplication of services, particularly the independent loan appraisal and 
monitoring, retail GF‘s are considered the most costly model.  This cost is considered 
justified by many GF practitioners because of the extra layer of oversight, as well as the 
fact that the GF may have a special knowledge of a group of borrowers which allows it to 
conduct a more accurate appraisal than a bank (Colwell 2008).  Another significant 
advantage of retail GF‘s is the personal contact with the borrower.  This not only 
improves the appraisal of the loan, but a retail GF can also require the borrower to 
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perform certain actions to receive a guarantee, such as attending educational events or 
receiving mentoring or counseling that will increase their likelihood of success.   
Retail guarantee funds were traditionally the most common form of GF, however, as 
value of the extra oversight has been questioned, many GF‘s have moved to a portfolio 
model.  A portfolio guarantee fund creates partnerships with banks that allow for an 
automatic guarantee mechanism essentially invisible to the borrower.  A contract between 
the bank and the GF details which borrowers are eligible for a guarantee, as well as fees 
and other operating procedures.  The bank chooses which eligible loans to apply for 
guarantees and forwards the request to the guarantee fund.  Depending on the 
arrangement, the GF may do a cursory review, or in many cases, the guarantee will be 
automatically granted in order to speed up processing time.  The GF will typically 
perform a regular review of the portfolio to insure compliance with the contract.  A 
portfolio approach is typically the least costly since it does not duplicate services with the 
bank, and is often the most attractive to borrowers since it is the fastest and makes the 
least requirements of them.  Many portfolio models require very little time for approval 
such as 2 days or less, and some don‘t require any prior approval at all, delegating the 
responsibility to the bank which registers the loan after it is issued. 
The prevalence of retail appraisals has been shrinking as more retail GF‘s have come to 
rely on the bank‘s appraisal with only a cursory review of the application to ensure it 
meets eligibility requirements.  Many GF‘s also operate both retail and portfolio 
operations simultaneously as well.  In these hybrid models, banks typically begin a 
relationship with the GF and have all of their applications independently reviewed at the 
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beginning.  After the bank has shown sufficient capacity in utilizing the program and 
following guidelines, the bank may be allowed to use abbreviated applications, or granted 
outright authority to make credit decisions.  The United States‘ Small Business 
Administration (SBA) is a large example of a hybrid fund.  While the SBA still performs 
individual loan reviews on a large number of applications, it has also created several 
programs in which banks can simply submit abbreviated applications for qualified loans.  
Depending on the program and the type of loan, these applications may be evaluated 
within 1 day or in some cases automatically approved (Small Business Administration 
2010).  Other programs allow loans under a specific threshold to be approved 
automatically on a portfolio basis, while loans over the threshold have to be 
independently reviewed. 
Variations of Guarantee Funds 
Within these major categories of guarantee funds exists a multitude of variations.  While 
guarantee funds all over the world tend to operate in generally similar ways, many also 
have unique aspects that differ greatly, even among otherwise very similar funds.  While 
several studies have examined the variations in major areas of the funds, such as 
governance and funding, other unique aspects, such as how the guarantee level is set have 
been little studied.   As most of the guarantee fund literature from the major international 
organizations tends to offer fairly generalized guidance, guarantee fund practitioners may 
not realize all of the options they actually have available to them. What follows is a 
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discussion of some of the variations of guarantee funds around the world, along with 
examples of the variation in practice. 
Highly Targeted Guarantee Funds 
All of the guarantee funds discussed in this paper are targeted toward SME‘s, and many 
have little or no restrictions about which SME borrowers qualify for guarantees.  
However, some funds have much more specific targets within the SME group.  Common 
targets may be the type of industry (agriculture, technology), borrower demographics 
(women, minority), and location (rural, urban centers).  The primary benefit of targeting 
is that economic development efforts can be sharply focused to promote growth in an 
area policy makers deem necessary and important.  Another potential advantage is that 
the guarantee fund may have specialized knowledge about its target group that allows it 
to make a better analysis than a bank would be able to.  For example, South Korea 
operates the Korea Technology Finance Corporation (KOTEC), which is part of a larger 
organization named Kibo.  This program provides guarantees to SMEs involved in 
technology related fields.  The GF has developed a specialized system of Technology 
Appraisal Centers (TAC) in order to provide guarantees based on the potential of new 
and emerging technologies, rather than more common financial metrics.  The fund states: 
Kibo focuses our guarantee support on those technology-based enterprises, 
start-up companies and venture firms which, in spite of their somewhat 
poor prior achievements, we consider to have excellent technological 
power as well as the potential to create Korea's future economic growth 
25 
 
engines and to generate new employment.  (Korea Technology Finance 
Corporation, 2008, pg 13) 
Traditional bank lenders would rarely, if ever, be willing to base a loan on an unproven 
technology.  However, by specializing in this area, KOTEC has been able to support 
technology companies with high growth potential, while remaining sustainable and not 
incurring an excessively high default rate.  Similar evaluations are also made by rural and 
agriculture based GF‘s as well. 
The primary disadvantage of highly targeted GF‘s is that risk management is 
compromised by having the loan portfolio concentrated in one area.  A common risk 
management technique among lenders is to diversify their portfolio in a variety of areas.  
In this way the lender is not at risk of excessive losses if something adversely affects a 
specific group of borrowers.  By committing to supporting one group of borrowers, a 
targeted GF will bear the full brunt of any diminished performance by the sector, 
regardless of how well they screened their borrowers.  Even without adverse conditions, 
targeting has other risks.  Depending on the size of the target, the GF may have difficulty 
finding an adequate number of qualified borrowers, and thus may offer guarantees to 
borrowers that they normally would not accept.  This may be particularly true if there is 
political pressure from leaders seeking to show that they are supporting a disadvantaged 
community.   
In choosing to target a fund very specifically, management should likely take the 
increased risk into account and plan for increased support from those contributing to the 
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fund.  While it also may be possible to charge higher fees to compensate for the risk, the 
higher cost of capital may well increase the default rate, forcing increased support 
anyway. It would seem wiser to temper expectations and accept that some level of future 
support will be necessary to continue to promote development of the target group.   
Other examples of highly targeted guarantee funds exist as well.  For example, Morocco 
operates several targeted GF‘s, including the FGIC, which is aimed at small and medium-
size enterprises involved in the art and entertainment industry, as well as a GF targeted at 
young entrepreneurs (Morocco Ministry of Economy and Finance 2010).  Lithuania 
operates the Rural Credit Guarantee Fund which only offers guarantees for small 
businesses involved in agriculture or located in primarily agricultural areas (Rural Credit 
Guarantee Fund-Lithuania 2010). 
Mutual Guarantee Institutions 
Mutual Guarantee Institutions (MGI‘s) are organizations made up of companies from the 
same industry or region, which join together in order to seek more favorable credit terms 
and availability.  These programs are often created and administered by trade associations 
or chambers of commerce.  Member companies pay fees or pledge collateral which are 
pooled together to form a guarantee fund.  Contractual arrangements are then made with 
banks to offer credit to members, often at a lower rate than they could receive without the 
guarantee.  When members receive these loans, they pay an additional fee, usually a 
percentage of the loan amount, to the guarantee fund. 
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Italy is widely recognized as having the most prevalent network of MGI‘s, though they 
are also found in smaller numbers in Germany, France, Spain and other areas around the 
world.  Approximately 12% of SME loans in Italy are made with the backing of a MGI 
(Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2009).   
Mutual Guarantee Institutions are typically not funded solely by members.  In fact, in 
many cases, only 1/3 of the guarantee‘s capital is from members, with the rest being 
contributed by governments or NGOs (Columba, Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2009).  
MGI‘s have been shown to both decrease the cost of capital and increase access to 
capital, although not by particularly significant amounts (Columba, Gambacorta and 
Mistrulli 2008).  Furthermore the authors find that the size of the MGI is important to 
determining the improvement in interest rates offered to members.  As an MGI grows, 
banks are more willing to offer better terms.  However, at some point, membership grows 
too large for the MGI to adequately monitor members and defaults will rise, thus making 
banks insist on higher interest rates to compensate for the increased risk (Columba, 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli 2008). 
Mutual Guarantee Institutions have the advantage of a built in screening mechanism 
through membership in the organization.  The greater knowledge that the MGI has about 
its members, both before the loan and during repayment, has the potential to greatly 
improve default rates.  The MGI may restrict certain members from accessing the 
guarantee fund if there are concerns about its finances.  While the these organizations are 
typically far too large for members to police each other during repayment (such as in 
many micro lending schemes like the Grameen Bank), members still have incentives to 
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insure the administration of the program is diligent in its duties, because any default will 
put the group‘s capital at risk and could result in worse borrowing conditions for 
companies in the future.  The MGI also has the advantage of needing less government or 
donor funding due to the member contributions.   
A typical example of how a Mutual Guarantee Institution works in Italy is Fidindustria, 
which supports small businesses in the Bari province of southern Italy.  To apply, local 
SMEs must submit 3 years worth of financial records and make a one-time payment of 
500 Euro.  They also must provide a 3000 Euro letter of credit that is added to the 
guarantee fund capital.  When the member wants to take a loan, they pay a fee (based on 
risk, maturity and loan amount) to the guarantee fund.  The coverage ratio for all loans is 
50% (Fidindustra 2010). 
Capital Access Programs 
A Capital Access Program (CAP) is a unique form of loan guarantee mechanism.  While 
the objectives are identical to other GF‘s, allowing nearly qualified SME borrowers to 
access credit by providing banks with a guarantee of partial repayment on default, the 
methodology is quite different.  A CAP is similar to a portfolio guarantee fund in 
allowing banks to make the credit appraisal, but differs greatly in how loans are 
guaranteed and how the program operates and is funded.  Capital Access Programs have 
elements of an insurance program, loan loss reserve account and economic development 
program.   
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Banks choose which borrowers they will include in the program, and the only paperwork 
involved is typically a short application form enrolling the loan and certifying that it 
qualifies for the program (in many cases this can be filed after the loan has already been 
made, meaning there is no delay for the borrower).  The bank charges the borrower a fee, 
which is a percentage of the loan amount, and could be thought of as an insurance 
premium paid by the borrower in order to obtain the loan.  This percentage is negotiated 
between the borrower and lender and depends on how risky they judge the borrower to 
be; typically the fee will range from 1% to 5%.  At this point, the process is identical to a 
bank charging a risk premium to a borrower and creating a private loan loss reserve.  
However, under this program, the CAP then matches the fee amount dollar for dollar, or 
occasionally by a higher multiple.  These funds are then deposited into an account owned 
by the CAP (but often held at the lending bank).  The funds deposited in this account are 
not tied to a specific loan, but rather grow over time and can be used to cover any CAP 
loans that default. The bank can only access these funds in the event a CAP loan default 
(it remains the CAP‘s money otherwise), and only under the contractually agreed upon 
terms.  If a defaulted loan is for more than the amount held in the CAP account, the bank 
is liable for the rest of the loss.  However, as the bank enrolls more loans, the CAP 
deposits can grow large enough to provide a strong cushion against defaults. 
Capital access programs are almost exclusively found in the United States and run by 
individual states, although several large cities have implemented programs as well.  
Eligibility for the program is normally fairly broad and covers most small businesses.  
However, CAP‘s often adjust their match multiple, depending on the borrower, to better 
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accomplish economic development goals.  For example, Illinois increases its match to 1.5 
for loans to women, minorities and the disabled, and to 2 times for loans in Federal 
Enterprise Zones, while Connecticut contributes an amount equal to 30% of the loan for 
borrowers in designated urban areas (United States Treasury 2001), and Ohio has 
recently begun offering a contribution equal to 80% of the loan amount for state certified 
minority businesses (Ohio Dept of Development 2009). 
There are several key advantages to capital access programs.  From the bank and 
borrower‘s perspective, the speed and simplicity of the program are almost unmatched.  
From an economic development perspective, the program is able to focus its efforts on 
specific targets to better accomplish policy goals.  From the state or municipality‘s 
perspective that is funding the program, they have a defined financial risk that cannot 
change, unlike conventional guarantee funds that could face unexpectedly high defaults 
that would require substantial additional state funds to cover.  Capital access programs 
are also generally considered to have much lower operational costs, since they typically 
have very low administrative overhead and do not need to perform any of the loan review 
or collection activities that a traditional GF conducts.  The average state run CAP only 
employs the equivalent of 1.3 full time workers (United States Treasury 2001). 
Capital access programs should also have a high probability of increasing the amount of 
loans that would not have been made otherwise, which is known as financial additionality 
or incrementality.  While banks may prefer to have borrowers pay the highest fee allowed 
by the CAP in order to build their loss reserve quickly, borrowers may reject a high fee if 
they can receive the loan at a lower cost elsewhere.  This helps to insure additionality 
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because practitioners assume that borrowers know their options and would not accept a 
higher price to participate in a CAP when they could get a loan at a lower rate elsewhere.  
However, the assumption that borrowers are always well informed may not be accurate, 
as was pointed out in a study of the Michigan CAP that found almost one third of 
borrowers did not know they were participating in the program or were paying extra fees 
(Hamlin 1998).  While these loans may well be truly additional, it also may be possible 
that borrowers do not adequately explore their options prior to accepting the loan, simply 
accept the price their banker offers without negotiating, or may be taken advantage of by 
unscrupulous bankers.  This issue is not confined to CAPs, as the same thing could occur 
with portfolio guarantee funds as well.  However, due to the speed, simplicity and virtual 
invisibility of CAP‘s versus GF‘s, there is a greater likelihood of a borrower being 
unaware they were not receiving a standard loan.  Requiring disclosure of fees and some 
level of borrower education would seem to be a prudent move to insure that banks aren‘t 
simply enrolling loans they would have made outside the program simply because they 
know they can charge an unwitting borrower a higher fee and build up their loss reserve 
account. 
Capital access programs have drawbacks as well.  A conventional guarantee fund is often 
politically popular because it requires an early investment that promises to support a 
much greater amount of loans with very little follow up support (at least in theory), while 
a CAP requires substantial  investments by the funding authority for at least the early 
years of the fund, and in some cases into perpetuity.  Programs differ in how they allow 
funds to re-circulate, which in turn impacts the program‘s level of self-sustainability.  For 
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example, in the Hawaii Capital Access Program, when a bank‘s loss reserve fund reaches 
33% of its outstanding CAP loans, any excess can be withdrawn and re-circulated to 
support new loans by any bank in the program.  Furthermore, the state also withdraws all 
interest earned by the reserve account and can re-circulate those funds as well (Hawaii 
Dept of Business 2002).  However, in the Arkansas CAP, banks are allowed to let their 
loss reserve balance grow indefinitely (which means they can be well over 100% of 
outstanding loans), and banks are allowed to keep half of the interest earned (Arkansas 
Development Finance Authority 2010).  This means that the CAP must always rely on 
state funding for new loans. 
Therefore, particularly in the early years, CAP‘s are always in danger of being shut down 
due to budget issues or political shifts, and this uncertainty may dissuade banks from 
participating.  Furthermore, poor economic conditions may cause an increase in default 
rates which could dramatically decrease the level of the bank‘s loss reserve accounts.  In 
this case the program would almost certainly require extra funding to replace the excess 
funds they had expected to withdraw and re-circulate.   
Banks also may be unwilling to take on risky loans through the program when first 
starting because the funds deposited would only cover a small fraction of the loan in the 
event of a default.  Several states have addressed this by providing a significantly higher 
matching deposit for a bank‘s first several loans.  For example, Ohio contributes 50% of 
the loan amount for a bank‘s first 3 loans, allowing them to build a loan loss reserve very 
quickly (Ohio Dept of Development 2009).  Other states have offered credit lines to 
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cover early defaults; these credit lines are then repaid with future bank contributions to 
the CAP deposit (United States Treasury 2001). 
Capital access programs also leverage their invested capital differently than traditional 
guarantee funds.  For comparison, consider a traditional GF which has $10 million in 
capital that they are able to leverage 5 times at a 75% coverage ratio.  Thus they can 
guarantee a total of $66.6 million in SME loans at any one time.  Given an average 
maturity of 3 years, the GF would provide approximately $22 million a year in 
guaranteed loans (loan maturity greatly alters this figure, making a comparison such as 
this purely for illustration purposes).  A capital access program by contrast may receive 
funding of $1 million a year.  If the average fees paid by the bank and borrower were a 
combined 4%, and the matched dollar for dollar by the CAP, the program could cover 
$25 million in loans per year.  For illustration purposes, assume only one bank is 
involved in the CAP.  After one year the loss reserve deposit would total $2 million, or 
8% of the total loans (well above most SME default rates anywhere in the world). 
After 10 years, the CAP would have had $10 million invested by the government, 
funding approximately $250 million in loans.  Over this time the loan loss account would 
have had $20 million deposited.  Even assuming a very high default rate of 6%, equaling 
$15 million in losses, the reserve fund would still have a $5 million balance, plus any 
interest earned over the 10 year period and no future loss risk to the government.  In 
contrast, the traditional guarantee fund with its initial $10 million dollar investment could 
have guaranteed around $223 million in SME loans.  However, this figure could be 
highly variable depending on the amount of leverage the fund was able to use, the costs 
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incurred by the fund and the maturity of the loans.  If the loans had long maturities, the 
fund would not have been able to turn them over quickly, thus reducing its total loan 
amount.  Furthermore, if the default rate was unexpectedly high, the government could 
face substantial future liabilities. 
Though starting and funding a CAP comes with the added political difficulty of indefinite 
continued funding, the CAP model offers several distinct advantages to a traditional GF.  
Most notable are the reduced risk undertaken by the government, the more certain 
financial projections available, and the low cost of operations. 
Market Based Funds 
While a variety of funds adjust their pricing and coverage ratio based on targeted 
borrowers or bank performance, these are arbitrary figures arrived at by the organization 
and may not be efficient.  The Chilean guarantee fund, FOGAPE, is unique in that it uses 
market mechanisms to set coverage ratios and allocations for the amount of guaranteed 
loans participating banks can make.  The coverage ratios and allocations are determined 
through an auction in which banks bid on the level of coverage they will accept.  For 
example, if a bank is willing to accept coverage for 65% of its guaranteed loans, rather 
than 70%, it can receive a higher allocation (Cowan, Drexler and Yanez 2008).  While 
one research study has shown that the guarantee coverage level can affect default rates 
(Cowling 1998), it is likely that this is at least partially tied to economic conditions, as 
well as other factors, such as the type or maturity of a loan.  Given that economic 
conditions change, and that different banks will choose to make different loans, it makes 
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sense that this should be flexible helps to insure that FOGAPE is operating in as efficient 
manner as possible.  Why provide 75% coverage for a loan if a bank would be willing to 
make it for 65% coverage and take some of the burden off of the guarantee fund or 
government?  While the Chilean guarantee fund has received a good deal of international 
attention and interest, it is unclear whether other guarantee funds have actually adopted a 
similar bid system. 
  
36 
 
Chapter 4   
Guarantee Fund Operations 
Choosing Guarantee Recipients 
A key element that distinguishes guarantee schemes from other government development 
programs, such as loans or grants, is that they rely on banks to determine recipients.  
Since banks have specific experience in judging the credit worthiness of borrowers, the 
guarantee fund can leverage this expertise to help avoid bad borrowers (Arping, Lуrбnth 
and Morrison 2008).  While some schemes rely almost totally on the banks to determine 
recipients, such as portfolio schemes and Capital Access Programs, many guarantee 
funds, such as the United State‘s Small Business Administration, perform their own 
credit appraisal on a large portion of their guarantees.   
While the assessment increases the guarantee fund‘s costs, it is considered justified if the 
fund has an information advantage that allows it to conduct a better review and thus 
lower the default rate of guarantee recipients (Honohan 2008).  However, many funds 
that do not conduct independent assessments have very low default rates as well.  These 
funds rely on the bank‘s assessment to make the credit decision, as well as regulations 
that penalize a bank for having excessive defaults.  By penalizing banks, often by 
restricting future guarantees, charging higher fees, or rejecting the guarantee claim in 
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cases of non qualified loans being enrolled, the GF can provide incentives to the bank to 
provide diligent monitoring and not attempt to exploit the program. 
Banks and Guarantee Funds 
Banks seem to certainly recognize the potential value of serving the SME market; 
however, the potential profit is offset by the increased costs that come with serving this 
market, and, therefore, banks find it necessary to develop new mechanisms and structures 
to work with SMEs, as well as to adapt their business and risk models to reduce the risks 
and costs of serving SMEs (De la Torre, Peria and Schmukler 2008; Davies 2007).  
Guarantees can be an important part of a bank‘s plan to work with the SME market.  
Banks have several incentives for involvement with a SME guarantee fund.  Many banks 
recognize the potential value of the SME market and see the use of guarantees as a way 
to gain experience with the market.  In the case of SBA guarantees, banks are able to 
securitize the guaranteed portions of their loans and sell them on the securities market.  
Rather than hold the loan themselves, the bank sells it to an investor who pays the bank a 
lump sum in exchange for receiving the future payments. This allows the bank to quickly 
regain capital that they can loan out again.   
However, there are also several disincentives for banks to utilize guarantees.  The most 
commonly cited problems for banks are the additional bureaucratic tasks, such as 
applications, and oversight, as well as difficulties in getting paid through the guarantee in 
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the event of a default.  Smaller banks seem to have the most trouble with repayments.  
(Bradley and Kirtley 2008) 
How Banks Utilize Guarantees 
A recent survey (Temken and Theodos 2008) of lenders utilizing SBA guarantee 
programs found that the lenders felt the guarantees allowed them to serve borrowers who 
did not quite meet their conventional underwriting standards, but they still considered 
attractive clients.   The most common reason cited in the survey for a company‘s use of 
an SBA guarantee is that company does not have adequate net operating income (NOI) to 
meet the debt service coverage ratios (DSCR) required for a conventional loan term.   By 
utilizing the guarantee, lenders could extend the length of the loan beyond their normal 
term to make the payments affordable to the borrower.  The study‘s authors do not 
provide survey statistics, but they do state that collateral constraints are the second most 
common reason borrowers are referred to an SBA guarantee, particularly when the 
borrower is purchasing specialized equipment that would be hard to liquidate in the event 
of a default.  
While some banks may prefer to have more of their borrowers covered by a guarantee, 
competitive pressures are cited as the prime reason why borrowers do not utilize a 
guarantee (Temken and Theodos 2008).  Since utilizing a guarantee will virtually always 
cost more than conventional financing, a rational borrower that can obtain a loan without 
a guarantee will choose to do so.  Therefore banks realize the risk of losing the client if 
they require a guarantee when another bank would not.  This phenomenon is also cited as 
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evidence that guaranteed loans are truly additional, since companies would not pay a 
higher rate if they did not have to.  However, the evidence on additionality is 
inconclusive.  One possible explanation is that borrowers do not adequately shop for 
loans, or fully understand their credit terms (see the section on financial additionality for 
further discussion of borrower understanding).   
Interest Rates and Fees for Guaranteed Loans 
Interest rates for guarantee fund borrowers are determined in a variety of ways. Some 
guarantee funds cap the interest charged on loans.  For example, the SBA caps the rate at 
a certain percentage above the prime rate (SBA 2010), though most leave it to the bank 
and the borrower to negotiate.  Nonetheless, total borrower costs are almost always 
higher than conventional loans due to the Guarantee Fund‘s fee.  For example, in the 
Thailand Guarantee Fund, guaranteed borrowers do receive a lower rate, by about 1% , 
than they would have otherwise;  however, after the loan fee is included, total costs are 
still higher (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 2006).  Members of Italian 
Mutual Guarantee Institutions also were shown to receive a lower cost of capital than 
similar non member borrowers; about 1.5 points lower interest rate than the bank average 
for similar firms (correlating to 16-20% reduced borrowing costs; Zecchini and Ventura 
2009).  However, the authors do not state whether this savings was before or after the 
guarantee fee, though it appears to be before the fee, meaning at least some, and possibly 
all, of the savings are negated by the guarantee fee. 
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While utilizing a guarantee will typically cost more for an SME than if they obtained 
conventional financing, the relatively small difference is negligible when compared to the 
higher costs many would be forced to pay if they accessed the grey market.  This is 
particularly true in developing countries, where informal lending rates can run as high as 
30% per month for short term loans, and 10% per month for longer term loans  (Davies 
2007; Colwell 2008; Wattanapruttipaisan 2003).  However, the same could be said for the 
US market, given that many small business owners tap high interest credit cards for their 
unmet funding needs (NSBA 2009). 
While banks see the potential profit in serving the SME market, they often have greater 
interactions with SME‘s in areas outside of conventional lending by offering other 
services that entail less risk.  For example, banks are more apt to offer short term secured 
loans, as well as more use of immovable and personal guarantees.  Furthermore, many 
banks main interactions with SME‘s are through non lending products, such as payment 
services, savings accounts, and advisory services (De la Torre, Peria and Schmukler 
2008). 
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Chapter 5  
Measuring the Success of Guarantee Funds 
There are enormous difficulties in measuring the success of virtually any economic 
development efforts, and guarantee funds are no exception.    A common theme in the 
guarantee fund literature is that there is no consensus on the effectiveness of guarantees, 
few good evaluations of guarantees have been completed, and that better evaluations are 
necessary in the future (Bartik and Bingham 1995; Boocock and Shariff 2005; Cressy 
2002; Green 2003; Levitsky 1997).  While measurements such as the total loans 
distributed are easy to obtain, these are not considered particularly useful without being 
put in the context of the cost of the loans and the outcome in the economy.  Default rates, 
which are an area researchers and policy makers are highly interested in, are often the 
most difficult statistic to find, if they can be found at all.  In the recent World Bank 
survey of guarantee funds, only 7 of the 45 entries included both the figures for amount 
of loans guaranteed and the amount paid out to banks in claims (Beck, Klapper and 
Mendoza 2008). Even when they are reported, they often vary greatly from fund to fund 
as to how they are determined, making comparisons very difficult.  However, while 
default rates are very important for determining the sustainability of a fund, they may be 
a poor gauge for the effectiveness of a fund.  A fund may have a high default rate, but it 
also may be supporting fast growing businesses that contribute far more to the economy 
than the fund sustains in losses.    
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Ultimately, metrics like loans made and default ratios have to be judged in the context of 
the economy and what effect the fund has had on the economy.  While these metrics are 
very important for determining the sustainability of the fund, they don‘t necessarily say 
anything about the impact of the fund on the economy.  The most common metrics for 
judging the impact of a guarantee fund are typically economic additionality, which is the 
improvement in the overall economy above the cost of the program, and financial 
additionality, which measures the increase in credit available.    
Economic Additionality 
Economic additionality refers to the improvement in the overall economy of the area 
studied, and is thus typically the main goal for any economic development effort.  For a 
government to put taxpayer funds at risk in support of private businesses there must be a 
potential gain for the populace.  Most commonly these gains will be in the form of 
increased employment or wages for workers, increased profits for owners, and increased 
tax revenue for the government, both through direct taxes paid by the business as well as 
indirect taxes from increased employment and production. 
However, even as a primary goal, there is very little definitive research on the economic 
additionality of guarantee schemes. This is due to several often mentioned factors in the 
research, including lack of adequate data, the relatively small scale of guarantee 
programs, and the difficulty controlling for the multitude of variables at work in any 
economy.  As a simple example of this last point, firms in fast growing regions or 
industries are more likely to have higher growth rates, regardless of their quality.  
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Therefore, providing economic development assistance of any kind will allow for 
positive results to be shown in terms of economic growth.  However, the firms may well 
have had equal growth without assistance (thus leaving the development resources to be 
saved or spent elsewhere).  On the other hand, slow growing regions that are most in need 
of development assistance will have poorer overall results, but the actual impact of the 
program may be much more positive, as without assistance, results could be much worse.  
Some evidence of this comes from a Polish guarantee fund, LFP, in which the guarantee 
fund‘s default rate and number of applications accepted closely tracked the national 
economy (Bennett, Doran and Billington 2005).  During a period of high growth in 
Poland from 1998-2000, the fund issued a large number of guarantees with no losses.  
However, as the economy became depressed after 2000, defaults rose and the fund denied 
more applicants than in the previous period.  Therefore, the overall economy seems to 
play a particularly strong role in the perceived success of a guaranteed fund, and thus 
should be considered when assessing a fund. 
 Difficulties notwithstanding, multiple attempts have been made to measure the economic 
additionality of guarantee programs, with somewhat positive results.  Some of the most 
relevant studies of guarantee funds, with regard to this paper, have been conducted 
through the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland on the SBA‘s loan guarantee programs.  
These are the most rigorous studies to date that attempt to determine the economic impact 
of loan guarantees.  However, like most other studies, the authors take great pains to 
caution readers regarding their research.  Most notably the authors cite their inability to 
control for other small business lending at the local market level, as well as their inability 
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to test whether the SBA programs materially increase the volume of small business 
lending in the market.  Nonetheless, even given the constraints of their study, the authors 
still conclude the following: 
…we are still led to the strong possibility that at the margin, additional 
credit allocation to low-income areas has a relatively higher level of 
economic impact on employment.  (Craig et al. 2008, pg. 357) 
While the authors did not find a positive relationship between SBA lending in a market 
and per capita income in the market, they did find a positive, although small, and 
significant relationship between the level of SBA lending in a market and future personal 
income growth, as well as a larger correlation on the average annual level of employment 
(Craig, Jackson and Thomson 2007).  A positive and significant correlation was also 
found between the average annual level of employment in a local market and the level of 
SBA guaranteed lending in that local market.   Furthermore, the intensity of this 
correlation is much larger in low-income markets. The authors point out that their results 
suggest that this correlation is positive and significant only in low-income markets (Craig 
et al. 2008). 
Boocock & Shariff found that some levels of economic additionality, primarily through 
employment growth, were observed in companies taking part in the Malaysian Guarantee 
Corporation (Boocock and Shariff 2005).  While the authors find that guarantee 
recipients outperform the Malaysian SME sector in regard to employment growth, they 
also point out that their methodology probably overstates the importance of the guarantee 
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fund.  Furthermore, the small sample size makes the data relatively suspect.  Finally, 
most of the employment gains were made by a very small number of firms (a 
phenomenon that recurs in the GF literature).  Removing just one of the top firms would 
dramatically alter the results.  On a macroeconomic scale, the guarantee fund was 
credited with helping to stabilize the economy during the Asian crisis by increasing its 
guarantee multiple from 9 to 15 in order to increase lending.  However, the default rate 
rose as well, requiring the government to eventually need to invest more capital in order 
to lower the multiple and retain the confidence of lenders. 
Boocock and Shariff also discuss the difficulties of enhancing economic additionality 
because banks and governments have differing incentives.  Banks are primarily interested 
in loan repayment, not with building the economy, thus structuring a program to do both 
becomes difficult. 
A similar study was performed on the Small Business Credit Guarantee Corporation of 
Thailand.  Guarantee recipients were compared with a cohort of 41 non guaranteed small 
firms to determine differences in employment levels based on employment elasticity.  
Although data availability limitations prevented results from being certain enough to 
strongly infer that additional funds provided through guarantees directly help increase 
employment opportunities, the overall results did suggest a positive relationship between 
employment and total loan amount (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and Vichyanond 
2006). 
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Bradshaw (2002) performed an analysis of the California State Loan Guarantee Program 
to determine its economic impact.  By tracking actual employment changes at over 1000 
firms over a 6 year period, the author found that employment increased in firms receiving 
loan guarantees by 40% (4633 jobs by 759 firms, or 6 jobs per company).  A group of 
sample firms were surveyed and asked how many workers would have lost their jobs 
were it not for the loan guarantee.  Respondents reported an estimated 14.5% 
employment loss without the guarantee.  The smallest firms (those with fewer than 20 
employees) credited the loan guarantee with helping to retain 16% of employment, 
whereas larger firms retained 9%. The program also increased state tax revenue by $25.5 
million, which was much greater than the $13 million cost of the program (Bradshaw 
2002). 
Further findings from this study found that employment gains were distributed among 
370 firms, which increased total employment by 7,654 jobs (an average of 20 per firm), 
whereas the losses were distributed among 297 firms, which lost 1,919 jobs (an average 
of 6.5 per firm). The remaining 92 firms did not change. However, a relatively small 
number of firms accounted for much of the actual job growth, whereas the majority of 
firms contributed just a few jobs to total employment growth.  Twelve firms grew by 100 
or more jobs each; in total, these firms accounted for 2,879 (50.2%) of the jobs gained.  
This means that 12 firms created the same number of jobs as the other 358 firms 
combined.   During this same time period though, small businesses in the state lost about 
11% of jobs, meaning guarantee recipients did fare much better than other firms, even 
exempting the high growth firms.   
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The authors also point out that even if loans don‘t necessarily equate to employment 
growth, they can still provide value to the economy.  They cite the example of a surveyed 
company that received a loan to implement a new labor saving technological process that 
allowed them to remain competitive.  The company said that without the loan, they would 
have gone out of business and would have lost all 8 of their employees, but with the loan 
they were able to retain 5 employees (Bradshaw 2002).  
One of a recent series of studies commissioned by the SBA and performed by the Urban 
Institute seek to determine the impact of the SBA‘s programs, including the loan 
guarantee programs (Brash and Gallagher 2008).  The study was conducted by obtaining 
detailed firm level data on guarantee recipients for a period of three years before and after 
receipt of an SBA guaranteed loan.  The authors immediately point out that a definitive 
answer to the question of whether SBA assistance helps the firms that receive it cannot be 
obtained without an impact analysis that is outside the scope of their project.  However, 
they did find firms receiving an SBA guaranteed loan did have average sales and average 
employment increases.  Further findings showed that younger firms receiving loan 
guarantees tended to have greater growth than older firms, and that industry and region of 
the country were significantly related to changes in sales and employment.   
For both sales and employment, a large percentage gain was typically seen in the first 
year after the loan, with a slightly smaller gain in the second year, and a significantly 
smaller gain seen in the third.   However, when compared to the three years before the 
loan, these results are not as positive.  For example, the authors found that while sales 
increased in the three years immediately following the loan, they actually grew at a 
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slower rate than the three years before the loan.  The same was true of employment 
growth, which occurred at a faster rate before the loan than after.  Mean employment for 
7(a) loans only increased by one employee per firm three years after loan receipt (Brash 
and Gallagher 2008). 
In other research, a study of the Canadian Small Business Fund (CSBF), though focused 
on loan additionality, estimated the program was responsible for creating approximately 
22,000 jobs per year in Canada (Riding, Madill and Haines 2007).  Case studies of four 
guarantee funds that were anecdotally judged to be successful found that they deserved 
some credit for the deepening of the financial sector in their respective countries (Egypt, 
Poland, Chile, India), and that guarantee funds are valuable in opening SME lending, but 
their impact diminishes over time (Bennett, Doran and Billington 2005). 
A particularly rigorous analysis of two South Korean guarantee programs that were 
studied from 2000 to 2003, just after the Asian financial crisis, found that while 
guarantees did have positive short term benefits, the study called into question the long 
run benefits of the program.  The guarantees were shown to help recipients maintain their 
size, increase their hiring and sales, and improve their chances of survival (Oh et al. 
2009).  However, the authors also found that, compared to a matched group of firms that 
did not receive the guarantees, recipients did not show productivity growth, nor did they 
invest in research & development (R & D) at the same rate.   
The authors of the South Korean study cited above concluded that guarantees were 
tending to go to support less productive firms in order to improve their chances of 
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survival.  While this may have been beneficial to maintain employment in the wake of a 
crisis, ultimately it resulted in overcapacity in the SME sector and allowed less 
competitive firms to survive.  This in turn would make the process of creative destruction 
less efficient, which could hinder the economy as innovative firms struggle or are forced 
out of the market by less competitive firms subsidized by guarantees. 
Financial Additionality 
Financial additionality, also known as incrementality, refers to the amount of loans made 
under guarantees that would not have been made otherwise.  In the present case, this 
refers specifically to creditworthy SME‘s that would not have received a loan without the 
participation of a guarantee fund.    Essentially, financial additionality is considered 
necessary in order for a guarantee fund to itself be necessary.  If the borrower could have 
received the loan for much the same terms as without the guarantee, than the government 
is essentially subsidizing lenders by taking on risk when the same outcome would have 
been the same anyway. 
Research regarding financial additionality has found mixed results.  Utilizing a 
methodology that is similar to credit scoring, a model was created through an analysis of 
the Canadian Small Firms Loan Guarantee program which found incrementality  
estimated at 74.8%, plus or minus 9% (with 95% confidence; Riding, Madill and Haines 
2007) .  While this was a very rigorous study, it only relied on survey data from one year 
(2001), which somewhat limits the conclusions that can be drawn.  None the less, this is 
easily the highest empirically derived estimate in the literature.   This study was updated 
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in 2009 and applied the previously created model to survey data from 2007.  The author 
found that the program seemed to be backing riskier loans, and estimated that 
additionality had increased to between 80-85% (Riding 2009).   
A study on the Chilean loan guarantee program found a significant impact on the 
availability of credit for SME‘s because of the existence of the guarantee fund.  
Furthermore, they found no significant effect on the default rates of borrowers utilizing a 
guarantee.  The authors state the following about these results, specifically noting what 
type of borrower is most likely to be helped: 
The explanation for this finding is that PCG (Partial Credit Guarantees) 
alleviates a market failure in the equity markets, increasing the availability 
of financing for entrepreneurs with low level of wealth. (Cowan, Drexler 
and Yanez 2008, pg. 3) 
A study of an Italian SME Guarantee program found a causal relationship between 
utilization of a guarantee and an increase in the amount of debt held.  The authors 
conclude that total SME credit additionality was 12.4% (Zecchini and Ventura 2009).  
This study is notable because the authors did not try to determine how many of the loans 
were additional, but rather what the total amount of additional credit was due to the 
guarantee.  This method has many advantages because a large number of very small loans 
cannot skew the figures.  Furthermore, as many studies have pointed out, the borrower 
may have been able to receive a smaller loan at the same terms, so therefore the entire 
loan was not additional, just a portion of the loan.     
51 
 
For example, in a study of the Malaysian Guarantee Corporation, no firms using the 
guarantee were found to be 100% additional, as all could have obtained some level of 
formal financing outside the guarantee.  However, most would not have been able to 
borrow the same amount under the same terms as they were able to with the guarantee.  
Through detailed interviews with a sample of 15 borrowers that utilized the guarantees, 
additionality was calculated at 37%.  This figure is lower than what was reported through 
a survey of a larger number of borrowers in Malaysia, again bringing into question the 
understanding of borrowers regarding loans (Boocock and Shariff 2005).   
Difficulties in Determining Additionality 
As all of the studies point out, most borrowers can obtain at least some credit without the 
guarantee.  However, if the smaller amount available was not sufficient to meet the 
investment needs of the business, for example, to buy new machinery, than the firm may 
have decided not to take a loan at all. In these cases, since the loan would not have been 
made without the guarantee, additionality could be viewed as 100% for these firms.  
Boockock and Shariff (2005) attempt to measure this phenomenon be examining a panel 
of 15 guarantee recipients.  They determined that 8 of the 15 likely could not have 
completed their investment plans without the guarantee.  However, they point out that 
since there is no way to be certain what borrowing decisions the firm would have made in 
the absence of the guarantee, accurately measuring this figure is difficult. 
Discrepancies between what borrowers state and what lenders state in surveys and 
interviews demonstrates another difficulty in determining financial additionality, that is 
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‗how certain is it that the loan could not have been obtained without a guarantee?‘  This 
is particularly acute when surveys are the principal source of information, and also calls 
into question how well informed borrowers are about their loans.  The issue of difficulties 
with surveys, particularly due to requiring recollection, and of the innate optimism of 
entrepreneurs possibly coloring their responses, has been mentioned in the literature as 
well (Riding 2009).   
Several of the research articles have also highlighted either a lack of information by the 
borrower, or a discrepancy between what the borrowers thought versus what the lender 
stated.  For example, in a survey of Palestinian SME‘s, 70% of respondents said they 
were denied a loan due to lack of collateral, though bank credit officers in the same study 
said that only between 27-42% of loans are rejected due to lack of collateral, a fairly 
significant gap.  While the authors do not explore the reasons for this discrepancy, they 
did seek additional opinions from banks not included in the survey, and these confirmed 
the bank officer‘s figures (Makhool et al. 2005).  While there are a variety of possibilities 
for this discrepancy, it seems likely that part of the reason is a lack of communication 
between the borrower and the lender, or a lack of understanding by the borrower.  This is 
a similar result to the finding that over 50% of the participants in the Michigan Capital 
Access Program did not know what program they were in, and 30% were not aware they 
were paying extra fees or even participating in any sort of program at all (Hamlin 1998).  
As further evidence of the borrower‘s lack of understanding, the author also pointed out 
that many borrowers did not know what types of additional collateral they had pledged, 
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saying they left such matters up to their accountants (though presumably the accountant 
hadn‘t negotiated the loan contract).    
As more evidence that surveys are difficult to rely on, a study for the Canadian Small 
Business Financing Program surveyed approximately 1000 borrowers, half of whom had 
received guaranteed loans in the last year, and asked each if they had applied for a loan in 
the last 12 months; only 66% of the guaranteed borrowers group responded that they had 
applied for a loan.  While it may be possible that a portion of the borrowers actually had 
applied for their loan over 12 months ago, but received it within the last 12 months 
(which was how the group was selected), it seems unlikely that a full third would fall into 
this category.  The reason for this discrepancy is not explored; however, the authors point 
out that it is consistent with a similar previous survey in which 18% of borrowers denied 
having ever applied for a loan, when in fact they had received a guaranteed loan in the 
recent past (Phoenix Strategic Perspectives 2007).   It may be possible that the person 
responding to the survey does not have full knowledge of the firm‘s operations, or, for 
whatever reason, does not wish to disclose anything about their credit, or that they have 
even received credit.  Regardless of the reason, it should be a cause for concern to 
researchers using interviews to base their studies upon. 
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Chapter 6 
Banking and SME‘s 
Small and Medium Enterprises 
Small and medium sized enterprises (SME‘s) are targeted by government interventions 
worldwide to support their growth and development.  The reasons for these interventions 
are often quite similar, and generally revolve around two ideas, which are also the two 
most commonly cited reasons for the existence of SME guarantee programs worldwide:   
1) SME‘s are tremendous engines of job creation and thus have an extremely important 
impact on the overall economy,  
2) SME‘s tend to lack access to formal credit at a level commensurate with their 
contribution to the economy.   
There is strong evidence on both counts.  Statistics generally tend to support the notion 
that SME‘s, as a group, are extremely important to employment in an economy, whether 
developed or developing.  For example, in India, SME‘s produce 40% of manufacturing 
output and 36% of direct exports (CGTSI 2003) and in Thailand, SME‘s are credited with 
creating about 60% of total jobs in the country (Anuchitworawong, Intarachote and 
Vichyanond 2006), a figure very similar to the 50% they are credited with creating in the 
United States (Headd 2010). 
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While most data is positive, much of it is also inconclusive.  For example, surveys across 
45 countries found a strong, positive association between the importance of SMEs and 
GDP per capita growth. The authors point out, however, that the data does not 
confidently support the conclusions that SMEs exert a causal impact on growth.  It may 
in fact be the case that a growing economy creates better conditions for small businesses 
to flourish, and not the other way around.  Furthermore, the authors point out that they 
find no evidence that SMEs alleviate poverty or decrease income inequality (Beck et al. 
2005).   
A British study examining entrepreneurship asked a random sample of workers, who had 
previously indicated that they had considered becoming self-employed, why they had not 
become entrepreneurs; the most common answer was a shortage of money or capital.  A 
separate British survey on entrepreneurship found that most small businesses were begun 
with personal or family funds, rather than with a bank loan, indicating that personal or 
family wealth was a major factor in starting a small business.  Furthermore, the same 
study found that most entrepreneurs felt they needed help with finance, and that the 
biggest concern of potential entrepreneurs was obtaining capital.  Finally, receipt of an 
inheritance or a gift seems to increase a person‘s likelihood of becoming self employed 
(Blancheflower and Oswald 1998). 
Information Asymmetry and Credit Rationing of SME’s 
On the topic of access to credit for SME‘s, there is a long body of literature examining 
the phenomena of ―credit rationing‖, which occurs when a bank chooses not to loan out 
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all available funds, although they have adequate opportunity to do so.  In this scenario 
credit is not equally available to all qualified borrowers.  There are a variety of reasons 
why this occurs, though in the case of SME borrowers, the prevailing reason is that banks 
cannot adequately determine which borrowers are creditworthy, and choose to limit their 
exposure.   This is often referred to as information asymmetry, and means that one party 
has access to more information than the other party.  In this case, information asymmetry 
refers to the fact that a lender has much less knowledge of the potential borrower‘s 
likelihood of default than the borrower does. 
The issue of information asymmetry is not unique to SME‘s, though it is likely more 
pronounced than for large corporations that can provide more detailed information.  
Furthermore, the age of the firm also greatly affects the information available, meaning 
new and relatively young firms have less historical data to provide in support of their 
loan application.  Research has shown that the financial assessment of the business is the 
most important factor in whether a loan is approved, regardless of whether a country is 
developed or developing (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008).  
Large companies can provide financial statements and a history of loan repayments that 
the bank can use to determine their creditworthiness.  Large companies can also typically 
pledge collateral to mitigate the bank‘s losses in the event of a default, as well as to show 
that the borrower has enough confidence in their business to risk property.  However, 
since many SME borrowers can provide neither financial statements nor collateral, banks 
do not have enough information to judge creditworthiness and often sharply limit SME 
loans. 
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 For instance, although a World Bank Survey of banks in 45 countries found that banks 
perceive the SME segment to be highly profitable, regardless of the country‘s level of 
development, they still limit their interactions with the sector.  One of the principle 
reasons is macroeconomic risk; banks feel small businesses are more sensitive to a 
downturn than larger businesses.  This is particularly true in developing countries, with 
39% of developing country banks calling it a major obstacle versus only 9% of developed 
country banks.   Another prominent reason banks avoid SME lending is because they 
tend to have much higher default rates (7.4% for small firms, 5.7% for medium firms) 
than larger firms (4%) when averaged across all countries (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 
2008).   
According to the aforementioned surveys, 45% of banks in developed countries cited 
competition for SME clients as a major reason why they do not have more SME business, 
while in developing countries, this figure was only 15% (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 
2008).  This difference illustrates the vastly different circumstances facing SME‘s in a 
developing country, versus those in the developed world.  While it gives great credence 
to the idea that SME‘s lack access to credit in the developing world, it calls into question 
this same claim about SME‘s in the developed world.    
While the barriers to accessing capital may be higher in developing countries, they do 
still exist in developed countries as well.  For example, increased and timely access to 
capital was the most consistent and pronounced of the recommendations of at least 12 
state and regional economic development studies in California, and 15 of the top 60 
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recommendations adopted at the 1995 White House Conference on Small Business 
(Bradshaw 2002).   
Differences in the banking systems in developed and developing countries also may play 
a role in credit rationing.  Developed countries often have more specialized lenders than 
developing countries, with smaller community banks and credit unions that target SME 
borrowers.  These lenders may offer better rates and service than a larger bank (a 
potential fault of the World Bank survey is that it only included large institutions, not 
taking these smaller players into account).  In developing countries, the banking sector is 
often made up of a few large banks whose primary business is lending to the government 
and large industries.  While these banks may lend to individuals and smaller businesses, 
this is usually a small fraction of their total business.   Therefore, by offering guarantees 
the bank‘s risk can be mitigated and they can be exposed to the SME market.  The 
expectation is that banks will learn about the SME market, view it as potentially lucrative 
and expand their activities without need for guarantees.   
While the notion of credit rationing is cited almost universally in the guarantee fund 
literature, there are arguments against its validity.  Most notably, De Rugy argues that 
there is no failure by the private sector to allocate loans efficiently (De Rugy 2006).  She 
also argues that the very small share of the United States SME market covered by SBA 
guarantees (less than 5%), serves to illustrate her point that almost all small businesses 
are able to obtain conventional financing.  Research on the UK Small Firms Loan 
Guarantee Fund (SFLG) also finds little evidence of credit rationing (Cowling 2007).  
However, the authors do point out that there is a pool of small firms, such as startups, 
59 
 
who will always find it more difficult to raise funds due to information asymmetry from 
the credit market, particularly when macroeconomic conditions are worsening, even if 
collateral is available.  A similar sentiment was expressed by a survey of SBA guaranteed 
lenders which found that most banks considered SBA loans to be a small fraction of their 
business, but felt they were important for increasing the share of lending to particular 
market niches, such as startups and businesses within certain industries (Temken and 
Theodos 2008).  This seems to suggest that guaranteed loans, particularly in developed 
countries may be better used to target a particular group of underserved borrowers, rather 
than SME‘s as a whole.    
While the extent of the credit rationing phenomenon may be debated, it nonetheless is 
often cited as a key reason for the existence of SME guarantee funds.   An economy is 
not reaching its full potential if investment plans that can increase employment growth 
and profitability are denied credit.  Interventions, such as guarantees, can allow 
creditworthy small businesses to access the formal loan market and contribute to 
economic growth.  This seems particularly true in developing countries that often have a 
limited banking sector and where macroeconomic risk and information asymmetry are 
major obstacles to SME lending. 
Lack of Collateral 
One of the most common reasons given for SME‘s inability to access credit is that they 
cannot provide collateral.  In many cases, and as noted previously, this directly relates to 
the personal wealth of the borrower.   In a survey of Palestinian SME‘s, 70% of 
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respondents claimed their loan application was rejected due to lack of collateral, and 
100% of the respondents who had been approved for a loan but did not take it cited the 
onerous collateral requirements (Makhool et al. 2005).   
Collateral serves to lessen the risk to the lender in the event of a default, and is a typical 
requirement of SME borrowers, with small firms tending to be required to pledge more 
collateral than larger firms (Pozzolo 2004).  Though a survey of SME lenders found that 
collateral trailed far behind the financial assessment of the firm in terms of importance 
for loan approval, 90% of the banks in the survey indicated that they required collateral 
of SME borrowers (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008).  Therefore, a business that 
passed the first test of the financial assessment may still be denied the loan due to lack of 
collateral (but a firm with full collateral would likely not get a loan if they had a poor 
financial assessment).  The same survey found that developing countries actually tend to 
use less collateral than developed countries (likely due to poor property registration), but 
not in greatly different amounts. 
Due to a variety of factors collateral is often unavailable for a SME borrower to pledge.  
For example, a credit worthy small businesses may be a startup, or may simply not have 
enough assets to pledge.  Furthermore, many developing countries lack reliable property 
registration systems, such that even if a borrower has assets, they may have no clear title 
to pledge, thus effectively barring them from the credit market.   
Hanson, (as cited by Cowling), expresses the point in the following way: 
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Entrepreneurial talent is not the prerogative of the wealthy, but is 
broadly distributed throughout the population as a whole. Without 
reasonable access to financing, many of our countries‘ most talented 
and aggressive entrepreneurs will be cut out of the economic system. 
Innovation and business development will become a luxury reserved 
for the wealthy, and the economy as a whole will suffer. (Cowling, 
2007 Pg. 4) 
Further evidence to show that borrower wealth directly relates to access to credit is 
presented in a study o f the UK‘s Small Firm Loan Guarantee Scheme, in which regions 
which had rising home values had lower rates of loan guarantee usage, presumably 
because borrowers were able to obtain conventional loans using their personal property as 
collateral (Cowling 1998).    
This lack of collateral by otherwise credit worthy borrowers is often the justification for 
intervention in the credit markets through guarantee schemes (Park 1995; Bulgaria 
National Guarantee Fund 2010).   Research has also shown that as firms build longer and 
better relationships with banks, collateral needs are lessened (Cowling 1999).  However, 
beginning these relationships is often very difficult for small firms, new firms, and poorer 
firms, thus the opportunity to start a banking relationship through a guarantee can be very 
valuable.  
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Transaction Costs and Adverse Selection 
Another often cited reason for why banks do not lend to SME‘s is the higher transaction 
costs involved relative to the size of the loan (Davies 2007).   Making many small loans 
is much more costly than providing a smaller number of large loans.  To overcome this 
cost, banks may charge a premium to smaller borrowers.  However, research has shown 
that an increase in the cost of capital can raise the default rate (Cowling and Mitchell 
2003).  Defaults may increase because the higher rates are onerous to the borrower, or, if 
the rate becomes too high, borrowers may feel the need to use the funds in high risk/high 
return projects to repay the debt. 
Adverse selection occurs when the terms offered by a loan will primarily attract riskier 
borrowers, and thus a bank will tend to only have risky borrowers to choose from.  For 
example, if a bank only offers loans at a relatively high rate, safe borrowers that can 
obtain funding at a lower cost elsewhere will choose to do so. This will leave the bank 
with only applicants that have high risk/high reward projects and are more willing to pay 
a higher rate.  Therefore, if a bank charges SME borrowers a considerably higher rate to 
compensate for their riskiness, the bank may only attract risky borrowers.  Higher costs 
of borrowing are directly related to higher default rates, and while this may partly be due 
to the higher costs of servicing the debt, this is also seen as evidence of adverse selection 
at work (Cowling and Mitchell 2003).   
This issue is also important for the pricing of guarantee fund fees.  The fund must charge 
a high enough fee to cover its costs and maintain its loss reserve.  However, if it charges 
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too high of a fee, safer borrowers will either be able to find funding at lower costs 
elsewhere without the guarantee, or they may forego the loan entirely because it is too 
costly.  This will only leave the guarantee fund with high risk projects to support, and 
because these will likely have a higher default rate, the fund may be unsustainable.  
Therefore, charging high rates to mitigate default risks may actually increase the default 
rates, creating a vicious circle that leads to the fund‘s demise. 
  
64 
 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion and Recommendations 
Small and medium sized businesses are recognized worldwide as being engines of job 
creation and vitally important for promoting economic growth.  A key limiting factor for 
SME‘s though is access to credit.  To alleviate this constraint, over 100 countries have 
established guarantee funds to help enable creditworthy SMEs to obtain loans.  While the 
programs are widespread, their effectiveness has received relatively little study, and 
opinions are mixed regarding their overall benefits.  One reason for the mixed results 
may be that a guarantee fund‘s structure is not well suited for the particular situation in 
which it operates.   
This research has attempted to answer the question of whether the economic environment 
and particular economic development goals of a country should be taken into account 
when choosing the structure of a guarantee fund.  The weight of the research does show 
that different structures do affect how well a fund can target guarantee recipients, as well 
as how efficiently the fund‘s resources are used.  Therefore, policy makers should utilize 
a deliberative process whereby they use their particular circumstances and goals to 
choose the structure that suits them best, rather than simply following the prevailing 
trends.  To aid in this process, comparison tables have been created through this research 
to serve as a guide in comparing different structures.   
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Analysis 
To date, guarantee funds in developed and less developed countries have generally been 
structured in different ways, based primarily on the perceived lower level of interest in 
small business lending by LDC banks, as well as their loan assessment ability.  Retail 
funds that require more oversight, have stricter borrower limitations and perform costly 
independent loan appraisals seem to be more prevalent in less developed countries.  
Portfolio funds that offer broader eligibility, limited loan appraisals and allow more 
independence for banks tend to be located in developed countries, and more funds in 
developed countries seem to be shifting to this model.  The justification for this is that 
developing country banks may not have the expertise necessary to deal with the SME 
market, they may not be interested in the SME market, and the risk of exploitation is 
greater, thus necessitating the extra involvement by the retail guarantee fund.  Developed 
country banks, in contrast, are considered to have higher interest in the SME market, as 
well as better knowledge and procedures, and thus can be trusted to make loan decisions 
independently.   
While these assumptions may be true, they do not seem to take the economic 
development goals of the guarantee fund programs into account.  In most developed 
countries, guarantees only support a small portion of SME loans, usually from 5-10%, 
and many of these borrowers may well have been able to get some level of credit without 
the guarantee anyway.  Furthermore, the most commonly cited reason for getting a 
guarantee is too extend the maturity of the loan in order to lower payments, rather than 
substitute for missing collateral.  This raises questions of the government essentially 
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subsidizing businesses and creating unfair competition for similar companies that did not 
get a guarantee and had to make higher payments.  There may be justification for this if 
the program was targeting specific groups of borrowers that could support economic 
development goals, but almost universally, guarantee funds have been moving toward 
broader eligibility.  If the main effect of a guarantee fund is to increase loan maturity, it 
seems that this should be broken out as a separate benefit and made more widely 
available to all SMEs.  As this could lower expenses quite dramatically for the SME 
sector, and likely at little cost to the government, it could have a big boost on the national 
economy. 
The argument that developing country banks are not in a position to adequately assess the 
creditworthiness of SMEs may be accurate in many cases.  However, if this is the case, 
then a guarantee fund would be quite valuable in the initial stages of operation, but 
should decline over time as banks gain more knowledge of the SME market.  This is a 
hard point to judge, but there does not seem to be any evidence of guarantee funds 
shutting down due to banks not needing their services anymore.  It seems likely that 
banks probably do benefit from the exposure to the SME market, but due to the nature of 
the borrowers, they are still not willing to lend to many due to a lack of collateral.  If this 
is true and banks can adequately appraise SME borrowers, but collateral is the binding 
constraint, then developing countries would be better served to move to portfolio models 
in order to lower costs and improve sustainability.    This would also ease any 
unconscious bias the guarantee fund‘s independent appraisal may have.  While this is not 
a topic that has garnered much attention in the literature, it seems that it could be a risk, 
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particularly in countries with sharp ethnic or religious divides, or even if the guarantee 
fund officers are simply more comfortable approving loans to one industry or region but 
not another. 
Therefore, the prevailing system may benefit from being shifted 180 degrees.  Developed 
countries may not be getting significant benefits from their scattershot approach and 
would be better served by highly targeting their resources toward specific economic 
development goals.  On the other hand, developing countries that have a sufficiently 
capable banking system likely would benefit from lowering costs and administrative 
burdens in order to more widely support SMEs. 
Where capital access programs fit into this equation is a little more difficult to determine.  
It is somewhat surprising that they have not expanded beyond the United States, but as 
SMEs will continue to remain a policy priority worldwide, it seems possible that they 
may begin to spread soon.  It would seem likely that developed countries would be the 
first to adopt a CAP scheme, as their banks have the most capacity to judge SME 
borrowers.  Furthermore, at some point it would not be surprising to see a developed 
country shift its guarantee fund operations into a capital access program.  Not only would 
it lower administrative overhead, but it would also remove a large potential liability from 
the government.     
Capital access programs may have a place in developing countries as well though.  
Certainly their low risk structure should appeal greatly to developing countries that fear 
taking on an inordinate amount of risk, and their low administrative costs make initiating 
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a program relatively simple.  Convincing policy makers to commit continuing support 
may be the biggest difficulty, but as the figures are relatively small on a national budget 
basis, this may not be a high hurdle.  The initial funding would need to be higher than 
future funding in order to attract banks and help to accelerate the growth of their loan loss 
reserves, but this may be accomplished through foreign aid or grants that provide funds 
targeting support for SMEs. 
Another consideration for developed countries is if guarantee funds are the best tool to 
accomplish economic development goals, particularly when not highly targeted.  A 
World Bank survey of SME lenders worldwide found that in developed countries, 
competition for SME loans was the main reason banks cited for not making more SME 
loans (Beck, Demirg-Kunt and Pera 2008).  If, in fact, competition is the main obstacle to 
banks offering SME loans in developed countries, rather than risk, than it seems possible 
that banks simply don‘t view it as profitable enough to pursue, regardless of how safe the 
loans are.   This makes sense, as smaller loans are always going to be more expensive to 
service, regardless of their default ratio.  To make them profitable, banks would have to 
charge higher interest rates, which the SME borrowers may view as too high (or would 
only attract risky borrowers causing a high default rate).  Perhaps addressing this through 
interest rate subsidies or other pricing mechanisms, rather than guarantees, would be 
more effective in increasing the amount of SME credit. 
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Tools for Choosing a Guarantee Fund Structure 
 
There are a wide array of guarantee fund structures, and no one structure can be 
considered the best.  Each structure has different variables, and finding the right 
combination of these variables to fit a particular economy can greatly improve the 
outcomes the guarantee fund will produce. Policymakers may be well served to ask and 
answer the following questions when choosing a guarantee fund structure. 
1. What is the level of engagement of local banks with SMEs, and what is their 
ability level in regards to assessing SME loans?  This answer will strongly 
determine whether secondary assessments are used, and how much support banks 
will require. 
2. Are we seeking to help a specific group of borrowers or all SMEs through the 
guarantee fund?  This answer will strongly determine what method of targeting is 
used. 
3. What level of risk is the government willing to accept?  This answer can give 
policy makers another dimension to compare structures by, instead of simply 
choosing based on perceived benefits. 
After answering these questions, policymakers can use the results to find a guarantee 
fund structure that will best fit their particular situation.  The following table may be 
helpful in that regard.  The table provides descriptions of the most common structures, as 
well as several indicators that will closely correspond to the questions above.   
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Conclusion 
The use of guarantee funds to promote SME development through credit access is 
unlikely to abate.  While many of these programs operate in relative obscurity, only 
getting attention when politicians wish to tout their support for small business, they still 
play an important economic development role.  However, whether this role is mostly 
positive, in that they are helping good businesses to grow, or negative, in that they are 
supporting struggling businesses that ultimately stifle innovation and may actually force 
out other businesses, is somewhat of an open question.  In any case, companies all over 
the world are currently receiving loans thanks to guarantee funds, and as such, policy 
makers should consider if the companies receiving the guarantees, and the way in which 
they are awarded is best promoting their economic development goals. 
In order to determine how well different guarantee fund structures are tailored to meet 
specific development goals however, better tools for measuring their effectiveness need 
to be developed.  The most common metrics currently, default rate, economic 
additionality, and financial additionality can tell a great deal about a guarantee fund; 
however, because there is no consistent standard of measurement for any of these 
metrics, accurate comparisons are impossible.  Creating an internationally accepted series 
of standards would not only allow for better comparisons, but with the standards set forth, 
GF‘s could better target their data collection.  These standards could be constructed by an 
international organization with an interest in GF‘s, such as the World Bank, or by an 
association of GF‘s, such as the AECM, which represents 34 GF‘s in Europe. 
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Guarantee funds are currently used by many less developed countries and can be 
important partners in microfinance development efforts.  Most notably, guarantee funds 
can serve as a bridge for borrowers between microfinance and conventional finance.  
Most microfinance efforts revolve around very small loans made by specialized 
microfinance institutions (MFI‘s) to individual entrepreneurs.  These borrowers would 
typically not be considered by a conventional bank due to the size of the loan and the lack 
of credit history.  However, as the entrepreneur‘s business grows and expands, they may 
outgrow the capabilities of the MFI, but they don‘t yet qualify for a conventional bank 
loan.  In this case, a guarantee is the ideal tool to transition a successful entrepreneur 
from microfinance to conventional finance.  A GF and an MFI can also be valuable 
partners for each other.  The GF will often have information about the small business 
environment that can be very valuable for microfinance recipients, and may also be able 
to encourage business relationships between the MFI and GF borrowers.  The MFI can 
also provide the GF valuable information about the credit worthiness of a borrower, as 
well as their business prospects, based on the MFI‘s past experience with the borrower. 
In conclusion, guarantee funds have been shown to have a positive impact on both 
employment and economic growth, particularly in low income areas and less developed 
countries.  While the degree of this impact, as well as the cost, is still being debated, 
guarantee funds have proven to be an important tool for helping entrepreneurs start and 
grow businesses all over the world.  However, it does not appear that most guarantee 
funds have reached their full potential for increasing job creation or promoting 
competition and innovation.  To accomplish this, better tools for measuring the 
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effectiveness of guarantee funds must be developed and policy makers must begin to 
more tightly tie the operation of their guarantee fund to their particular economic 
development situation and their economic development goals. 
Areas for further study 
There are a multitude of topics for further research into guarantee funds.  On a general 
basis, there is no ongoing effort to track guarantee funds or to create comparable 
measures with which to compare them by.  Furthermore, there are a significant lack of 
case studies regarding guarantee funds, particularly any that include details of their 
inception, funding (initial and ongoing), and operations, so that more accurate 
assessments of them can be made.  This is particularly true for many smaller programs 
and those in developing countries, since many do not provide any information in English, 
making research on them difficult, even with the aid of services such as Google 
Translate.  Case studies detailing the history of the program, how it is funded and 
operates, who its primary beneficiaries are, as well as any insights into strengths and 
weaknesses would be highly valuable.  
While several studies mention a distinction between the type of credit guaranteed 
(startup, expansion, working capital, etc…), there is very little discussion of which is the 
most advantageous.  Knowing what type of credit to guarantee to promote various kinds 
of economic development would seem to be invaluable information.  
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Many states offer higher match multiples in their CAPs for specific borrowers.  However, 
it is unclear how this affects banks willingness to make these loans.  While in the early 
stages of participation, a bank may by highly attracted to more quickly building its loss 
reserve and make a more risky loan, but once the reserve reaches a certain level, that 
same attraction may not exist.  If the extra match does not encourage banks to make these 
loans, than that portion of the program should be reconsidered to find better incentives 
for the bank. 
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